Publications
Books
2019: Semantic Pluralism
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Studies in Theoretical Philosophy 8.
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie
Introduction to the philosophy of language. Under contract with Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart (with Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou).
Articles
2022: Lying, Misleading, and Fairness
Ethics 132: 736–751.
2021: The Lying-Misleading Distinction: A Commitment-Based Approach
The Journal of Philosophy 118: 289–319.
2021: True lies and Moorean redundancy
Synthese 199: 13053–13066 (co-authored with Alex Wiegmann).
2021: Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation
Ergo 8 (co-authored with Alex Wiegmann, Neele Engelmann and Pascale Willemsen).
2021: Lob der Vermutung (In praise of conjectures)
Romy Jaster & Geert Keil (eds.): Nachdenken über Corona. Stuttgart: Reclam.
2021: To lie or to mislead?
Philosophical Studies 178: 1481–1501 (co-authored with Felix Timmermann).
2020: Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity
Inquiry. Special Issue: Semantic Variability. Online First.
2020: Lying with presuppositions
Noûs 54: 731–751.
2020: Presentism, eternalism and where things are located
Synthese 197: 2963–2974.
2020: Ways of using words: on semantic intentions
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100: 93–117.
2019: Lying with pictures
British Journal of Aesthetics 59: 243–257. Special Issue: Authenticity and Deception.
2018: Ambiguity and zeugma
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99: 749–762.
2017: Non-literal lies
Erkenntnis 82: 1367–1380.
2016: How many meanings for 'may'? The case for modal polysemy
Philosophers' Imprint 16.10: 1-26 (co-authored with Barbara Vetter).
2013: Against context-sensitivity tests
Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 189-209.
2013: Counting stages
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91: 311-324.
Miscellaneous
2019: Review of Michaelson and Stokke (eds): Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
2019: How pictures can lie
OUPblog.
If there is a text you would like to read but cannot access, feel free to contact me.
Books
2019: Semantic Pluralism
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Studies in Theoretical Philosophy 8.
- Reviewed as book symposium in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung:
1. My Précis
2. Comments by Katharina Felka
3. Comments by Max Kölbel
4. My replies - Review by Miguel Hoeltje in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie
Introduction to the philosophy of language. Under contract with Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart (with Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou).
Articles
2022: Lying, Misleading, and Fairness
Ethics 132: 736–751.
- This piece responds to Sam Berstler's "What’s the Good of Language? On the Moral Distinction between Lying and Misleading".
2021: The Lying-Misleading Distinction: A Commitment-Based Approach
The Journal of Philosophy 118: 289–319.
2021: True lies and Moorean redundancy
Synthese 199: 13053–13066 (co-authored with Alex Wiegmann).
2021: Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation
Ergo 8 (co-authored with Alex Wiegmann, Neele Engelmann and Pascale Willemsen).
2021: Lob der Vermutung (In praise of conjectures)
Romy Jaster & Geert Keil (eds.): Nachdenken über Corona. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- Awarded the third prize in the GAP essay competition Nachdenken über Corona.
2021: To lie or to mislead?
Philosophical Studies 178: 1481–1501 (co-authored with Felix Timmermann).
2020: Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity
Inquiry. Special Issue: Semantic Variability. Online First.
2020: Lying with presuppositions
Noûs 54: 731–751.
2020: Presentism, eternalism and where things are located
Synthese 197: 2963–2974.
2020: Ways of using words: on semantic intentions
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100: 93–117.
2019: Lying with pictures
British Journal of Aesthetics 59: 243–257. Special Issue: Authenticity and Deception.
- Featured in Oxford University Press Philosophy – Best of 2019 selection.
2018: Ambiguity and zeugma
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99: 749–762.
2017: Non-literal lies
Erkenntnis 82: 1367–1380.
2016: How many meanings for 'may'? The case for modal polysemy
Philosophers' Imprint 16.10: 1-26 (co-authored with Barbara Vetter).
2013: Against context-sensitivity tests
Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 189-209.
2013: Counting stages
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91: 311-324.
Miscellaneous
2019: Review of Michaelson and Stokke (eds): Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
2019: How pictures can lie
OUPblog.
If there is a text you would like to read but cannot access, feel free to contact me.
